Mental logic and its difficulties with disjunction by López-Astorga, Miguel
clacCÍRCULOclac 
de 
lingüística 
aplicada a la 
comunica 
ción 
 
66/2016 
 
 
 
 
 
López-Astorga, Miguel. 2016. 
Mental logic and its difficulties with disjunction. 
Círculo de Lingüística Aplicada a la Comunicación 66, 195-209. 
http://www.ucm.es/info/circulo/no66/lopez.pdf  
http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/CLAC  
http://dx.doi.org/10.5209/CLAC.52772  
 
© 2016 Miguel López-Astorga 
Círculo de Lingüística Aplicada a la Comunicación (clac) 
Universidad Complutense de Madrid. ISSN 1576-4737. http://www.ucm.es/info/circulo 
MENTAL LOGIC AND ITS DIFFICULTIES WITH DISJUNCTION 
 
Miguel López-Astorga  
University of Talca  
milopez at utalca cl  
 
 
Abstract 
The mental logic theory does not accept the disjunction introduction rule of standard 
propositional calculus as a natural schema of the human mind. In this way, the problem 
that I want to show in this paper is that, however, that theory does admit another much 
more complex schema in which the mentioned rule must be used as a previous step. So, 
I try to argue that this is a very important problem that the mental logic theory needs to 
solve, and claim that another rival theory, the mental models theory, does not have these 
difficulties. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a basic rule in standard propositional calculus that is said to be problematic 
from a cognitive point of view. That rule is the one of disjunction introduction, and can 
be formally expressed as follows: 
p / Ergo p v q 
Where ‘v’ stands for disjunction. 
The rule is problematic because the literature on cognitive science shows that people do 
not often use it. Thus, this circumstance has led to think that human reasoning does not 
work in accordance with the requirements of calculi such as that of Gentzen (1935). In 
fact, not even the current theories stating that the human mind applies logical rules 
when it reasons admit the disjunction introduction rule or claim that reasoning is based 
on standard logic. One of these theories is the mental logic theory (e.g., Braine & 
O’Brien, 1998a; O’Brien, 2009, 2014; O’Brien & Li, 2013; O’Brien & Manfrinati, 
2010). However, this theory has a difficulty in this regard. While it rejects the 
disjunction introduction rule, it admits, at the same time, another formal schema that 
supposes that rule. That schema is considered to be natural on the human mind and is by 
far more complex than the disjunction introduction rule. And, in addition, as said, it 
needs this later rule to be applied, since it can even be thought that the disjunction 
introduction rule is an indispensable previous step that must be fulfilled to apply the 
schema. 
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To show this is the main goal of this paper. To achieve it, I will firstly comment on the 
problems of the disjunction introduction rule in more details. Secondly, I will describe 
the mentioned schema proposed by the mental logic theory. And then, I will give 
arguments in favor of the idea that the schema cannot work if the disjunction 
introduction rule is not accepted. Nevertheless, before finishing, I will also explain that 
there is another rival theory, the mental models theory (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2006, 2010, 
2012, 2015; Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, & Goodwin, 2015; Khemlani, Orenes, & 
Johnson-Laird, 2012, 2014; Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 2012), which can account for 
most of the results in reasoning tasks related to disjunction and does not have 
difficulties as serious as those of the mental logic theory. I hence will begin with the 
disjunction introduction rule. 
2. The disjunction introduction rule and its problems 
The problems related to this rule are clear in the literature, and a very relevant fact in 
this regard is that, as mentioned, the mental logic theory does not admit it. Indeed, 
although the mental logic theory is a framework claiming that there is a logic on the 
human mind and that human thought is essentially formal and syntactic, it does not 
accept all of the rules of standard logic, but only those that empirical evidence shows 
that people actually use. Thus, in Braine and O’Brien (1998b, pp. 80-81) a table (Table 
6.1) presenting all of the natural schemata used by human beings is included, and the 
disjunction introduction rule is not one of them. The reason is evident: the experiments 
reveal that individuals do not always apply it. And this is explained in details in other 
papers and works authored by proponents of the theory, for example, in Braine, Reiser, 
and Rumain (1998, pp. 120-121). 
There is no doubt that the works on this issue are numerous. Nevertheless, maybe one of 
them especially relevant is that of Orenes and Johnson-Laird (2012). Many examples of 
reasoning problems with thematic content in which the disjunction introduction rule is 
involved are to be found in that paper. One of them is as follows: 
“Gorka tried the jam. Does it follow that Gorka tried ‘the chocolate cake’ or he 
tried the jam?” (Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 2012, p. 375). 
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Obviously, most of the participants in tasks such as this one responded negatively and 
could not accept that the fact that ‘Gorka tried the jam’ is true implies that the fact that 
‘Gorka tried ‘the chocolate cake’ or he tried the jam’ is true too. But a very important 
finding of Orenes and Johnson-Laird’s experiments is that there are certain cases in 
which this kind of problem is correctly solved. Which those particular cases are have 
been studied by López-Astorga 2015a) too, who has also analyzed to what extent the 
mental logic theory can explain these phenomena and the additional assumptions that 
this later theory needs to accept (and the modifications that it needs to make) to account 
for them. Nonetheless, beyond these particular problems of the mental logic theory, 
what is truly relevant for this paper is that, as said, while the theory explicitly rejects the 
disjunction introduction rule, in truth, one of its natural schemata reveals that that rule 
is, at the same time, presupposed by it, and that the mental logic theory can only be 
considered as a correct framework if it solves this problem and acknowledges that 
human beings can really understand the sense of the disjunction introduction rule in a 
natural way. The next section shows which that particular schema of the mental logic 
theory is, explains it, and reviews it. 
3. The Core Schema 2 of the mental logic theory 
As indicated, the mental logic theory is not about standard propositional calculus. There 
are many differences between the former and the latter. On the one hand, as also said, 
all of the rules of the latter are not admitted by the former, but other differences are 
deeper. For example, the principle of explosion (Ex Contradictione Quodlibet Sequitur), 
which, as it is well known, is absolutely valid in Gentzen’s (1935) calculus, is not 
accepted by the mental logic theory, and the reason is the usual one in this theory: 
experiments show that people do not reason following it. Of course, this can lead one to 
think that the mental logic theory proposes a logic that, at least in a sense, appears to be 
linked to systems such as that of Bolzano (1837), but it can also lead one to other 
problems that need to be solved. For instance, it can be thought that the theory needs to 
clarify why, beyond the empirical evidence, the principle of explosion is not 
theoretically valid in its system of schemata (see, for a discussion on these points and 
the relationship between the mental logic theory and logics such as the Aristotelian one, 
López-Astorga, 2016). 
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However, perhaps the most important difference for the aims of this paper is that the 
schemata of the mental logic theory can be of several kinds. One of these kinds is the 
Core Schemata set. The Core Schemata are schemata that, according to the proponents 
of the theory, people use and apply whenever they can. And one of these Core 
Schemata, which is Schema 2 in Braine and O’Brien (1998b, p. 80, Table 6.1), is this 
one: 
IF p1 OR…OR pn THEN q; pi 
-------------------------------------- 
q 
Obviously, we can use symbols and give this schema a logical form that transforms it 
into an inference with formulae in standard calculus (it have already been said that all of 
the schemata admitted by the mental logic theory are valid in standard propositional 
calculus). That logical form can be the following: 
(p1 v…v pn) -> q; pi / Ergo q  
On first thought, this seems a very complex inference. Nevertheless, Braine and 
O’Brien (1998b, p. 80, Table 6.1) inform that their studies reveal that its percentage of 
mistakes is 0%, which means that, given premises such as [(p1 v…v pn) -> q] and [pi], 
individuals practically always derive [q]. Thus, from empirical results such as these 
ones, the adherents of the mental logic theory claim that there is a ‘syntax of thought’ 
(Braine & O’Brien, 1998c), and that the formal structures of inferences lead us to draw 
particular conclusions, even if such structures are as complex as that of Schema 2 of the 
theory (for an analysis of this schema and discussions in this regard, see also, e.g., 
López-Astorga, 2015b). 
Nonetheless, as mentioned, there is a question that the mental logic theory needs to 
answer: if the syntax of thought allows applying Schema 2 where possible, why does 
not that syntax enable to apply the disjunction introduction rule too? And this question 
needs to be responded because, as also said, Schema 2 implies the disjunction 
introduction rule. The next section shows this point. 
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4. Braine and O’Brien’s Schema 2 and the disjunction introduction rule 
It appears to be absolutely clear that Schema 2 provided by Braine and O’Brien (1998b) 
is, as claimed by López-Astorga, a version of Modus Ponendo Ponens “with 
disjunctions embedded into the antecedent of the conditional” (López-Astorga, 2015b, 
p. 147). As it is well known, Modus Ponendo Ponens was proposed by Chrysippus of 
Soli (Diogenes Laërtius, Vitae Philosophorum 7, 80), and it is admitted as valid by 
several theoretical frameworks, including purely logical approaches, and reasoning 
theories. Its formal structure is also known: 
p -> q; p / Ergo q 
But it has a characteristic that, in principle, can seem to be problematic: its first premise 
is a conditional. This can be a difficulty because, as it is well known as well, the 
controversies on the conditional began in ancient times (e.g., Sextus Empiricus, in texts 
such as Pyrrhoneae Hypotyposes or Adversus Mathematicos, distinguishes four 
different interpretations of the conditional, including that of Philo of Megara, that of 
Diodorus Cronus, and that of Chrysippus of Soli), and they somehow continue 
nowadays (e.g., standard logic assumes the material interpretation, i.e., that of Philo of 
Megara, and the mental logic theory rejects that same interpretation). Nevertheless, 
these discussions have no an influence on the arguments that I will offer, since what is 
important here is to note that Modus Ponendo Ponens, whose initial version is also 
assumed as another Core Schema by the mental logic theory (it is Core Schema 7 in 
Braine & O’Brien, 1998b, p. 80, Table 6.1), only enables to derive the consequent of the 
conditional if the antecedent is true. 
If this is so, it is evident that it is only possible to draw [q] from [(p1 v…v pn) -> q], i.e., 
from the first premise of Schema 2, if [p1 v…v pn] is true. But the only information 
provided by the second premise is that [pi] is true, which means that individuals 
practically always (remember that the percentage of errors of Schema 2 is 0%) 
understand that the fact that [pi] is true implies that [p1 v…v pi v…v pn] is also true, 
which is to say that [p1 v…v pn] is also true, which in turn allows deducing [q]. There is 
no doubt that the mental process from [pi] to [p1 v…v pn] is an application of the 
disjunction introduction rule. So, it is necessary to explain why, if individuals seem to 
understand the nature of the logical disjunction, they do not often solve adequately 
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reasoning tasks with the structure [p / Ergo p v q]. After all, this later structure is much 
simpler than Schema 2 of the mental logic theory, and, if the latter is usually easy for 
individuals, the former should be so as well. 
In my view, this is an actual problem at foundation of the mental logic theory that 
cannot be solved without a substantial change in its basic theses. Therefore, maybe it is 
worth looking for the solution to these difficulties in other theoretical frameworks. 
5. Schema 2, the disjunction introduction rule, and the mental models theory 
A possible solution can be that offered by a theory mentioned above: the mental models 
theory. To this theory, what happens is that the human mind does not reason by virtue of 
logical forms, but of the consideration of semantic possibilities. Thus, given that a 
sentence such as [p v q] admits the semantic possibility of [p] being false and [q] being 
true, [p v q] cannot be concluded from [p], unless the meanings of [p] and [q] do not 
allow that semantic possibility. This is the case of, for example, a sentence such as 
“…Pedro tried ‘the chocolate cake’ or he tried the dessert?” (Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 
2012, p. 375). A sentence such as this one can be drawn from another such as “Pedro 
tried the dessert” (Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 2012, p. 375), and the reason is that it is not 
possible that Pedro tries ‘the chocolate cake’ and he does not try the dessert, because 
‘the chocolate cake’ is a dessert. 
Orenes and Johnson-Laird (2012) carried out experiments whose results were consistent 
with these ideas, and, as indicated, López-Astorga (2015a) analyzes whether or not the 
mental logic theory can also explain these phenomena. López-Astorga’s (2015a) thesis 
seems to be that the mental logic theory can only account for them arguing that 
disjunctions such as that of Pedro, ‘the chocolate cake,’ and the dessert are not actual 
disjunctions, but only apparent disjunctions, since the meanings of their disjuncts do not 
enable that either of the two disjuncts can happen without the other one (López-Astorga, 
2015a, p. 147). But this solution implies that, in general, people do not use the 
disjunction introduction rule, and this idea is in conflict with the fact that, according to 
the theory, individuals tend to use Schema 2. Therefore, it cannot be said that that 
solution solves the problem that is being addressed in this paper. And this regardless of 
the fact that it imposes a great challenge to mental logic theory, which would have to 
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supplement its framework with a procedure or algorithm that enabled to recover true 
logical forms from sentences that appear to have others. As far as this later point is 
concerned, López-Astorga’s (2015a, pp. 146-147) suggestion seems to be the analysis 
of the real truth tables of the sentences, but this task can be really difficult for the human 
working memory, and, at the moment, it cannot be said that an algorithm of that kind 
has been found (Johnson-Laird et al., 2015, p. 202). 
So, given all of these difficulties, the view of the mental models theory about 
disjunction appears to be more appropriate and clearer. This later theory proposes that 
the full set of semantic models of an exclusive disjunction such as ‘p or q’ is 
p   ¬q 
¬p   q 
Where ‘¬’ stands for denial. 
Obviously, the first model represents a situation in which the first disjunct is true and 
the second one is false, and the second model denotes a scenario in which the first 
disjunct is false and the second one is true. But “a mental model has a structure that 
corresponds to the known structure of what it represents” (Johnson-Laird, 2012, p. 136), 
which means that maybe a sentence such as that of Gorka, ‘the chocolate cake,’ and the 
jam is better represented without using the letters ‘p’ and ‘q’, and as follows: 
Chocolate cake ¬(Jam) 
¬(Chocolate cake) Jam 
Of course, this is so assuming that the disjunction is exclusive. If it were considered to 
be inclusive, a third model would have to be added, i.e., a model indicating that Gorka 
tried both ‘the chocolate cake’ and the jam. However, what is important to note now is 
that, as indicated, given those models and the information that ‘Gorka tried the jam,’ it 
cannot be deduced that ‘Gorka tried ‘the chocolate cake’ or he tried the jam,’ since in 
the first of the models Gorka did not try the jam, which is in conflict with the datum that 
‘Gorka tried the jam.’ 
Nevertheless, because the models are semantic and their meanings are relevant as well, 
the case of the second example indicated (i.e., that of Pedro, the dessert, and ‘the 
chocolate cake’) is different. From what has been said above, it can be deduced that, if 
the disjunction were considered to be exclusive, only one model would be possible: 
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¬(Chocolate cake) Dessert 
The other model (Pedro tries ‘the chocolate cake’ and he does not try the dessert) would 
not be possible because, as also mentioned, ‘the chocolate cake’ is a dessert. Therefore, 
as Orenes & Johnson-Laird (2012) experimentally checked and as indicated as well, 
individuals do tend to derive a sentence such as ‘Pedro tried ‘the chocolate cake’ or he 
tried the dessert’ form a sentence such as ‘Pedro tried the dessert.’ 
Evidently, this is a simpler explanation than the one that the mental logic theory can 
offer, even assuming the challenge proposed by López-Astorga (2015a), since, as it can 
be seen, no logical forms recovery process is necessary. Nonetheless, to address Schema 
2 of the mental logic theory, it is also required to take into account the semantic 
possibilities that the mental models theory assigns to the conditional. The full set of 
models of a conditional such as ‘if p then q’ is the following: 
p   q 
¬p   q 
¬p   ¬q 
But, as said, this is the full set of models, and the theory claims that people do not 
always detect all of them. In particular, the first one is almost always detected. 
However, the other two of them can only be identified if the individual makes further 
cognitive effort. From this point of view, it can be thought that, given a sentence with a 
structure as difficult as Schema 2, people will tend to consider only the first model, 
which, in the case of that schema, would be akin to this one: 
p1 or…or pn  q 
Nonetheless, because this model includes a disjunction in one of its clauses (p1 or…or 
pn), it can be said that it is not totally deployed. If we assume that the disjunction is 
exclusive and that n = 2, the actual models would be two: 
p1   ¬p2   q 
¬p1   p2   q 
Evidently, as in the previous cases, if we assumed that the disjunction is inclusive, one 
more model would be necessary (i.e., a model in which p1, p2, and q were all true). But 
the point is that these later models can be further simplified. As mentioned, the models 
indicated above for disjunction are also the elements of its full set, which means that, 
clac 66/2016, 195-209 
lópez-astorga: mental logic 204 
given a disjunction such as ‘p or q’, the models identified by individuals can omit the 
denials and (if interpreted as exclusive) be just 
p 
   q 
And this in turn means that the two totally deployed models of Schema 2 can also be 
simplified in this way: 
p1     q 
   p2   q 
Thus, it is absolutely clear that, given a sentence such as ‘if p1 or p2 then q’ and, for 
example, ‘p2’, ‘q’ can be easily derived. And this is so because in the only scenario in 
which ‘p2’ is true (the second one), ‘q’ is true too. 
So, the advantages of the mental models theory over the mental logic theory are evident. 
On the one hand, it can explain why individuals most of the time do not apply the 
disjunction introduction rule and in which cases they do use it. On the other hand, the 
mental models theory does not have problems such as those of the mental logic theory 
with regard to Schema 2. Under the framework of the former, the inferences with 
structures similar to that schema do not imply the use of the disjunction introduction 
rule, since, as accounted for, the mental processes are neither syntactic nor based on 
formal rules, but they only consider semantic possibilities. 
Nevertheless, a possible objection against the previous arguments could be that raised 
by López-Astorga (2015b). As reminded by him, the main theses of the mental models 
theory imply “that the inferences that refer to more models are more difficult than those 
that need less models” (López-Astorga, 2015b, p. 148). Thus, Modus Ponendo Ponens 
(or, if preferred, Schema 7 of the mental logic theory) should be less difficult than 
Schema 2, since the latter requires more models to be applied. However, in his view, 
there are certain facts that appear to prove that that is not the case. For example, in 
Table 6.1 in Braine and O’Brien (1998b, p. 80), it is indicated that, while Modus 
Ponendo Ponens has a percentage of mistakes of 2%, that of Schema 2 is, as said, 0%. 
This is clearly a problem for the mental models theory, because Modus Ponendo Ponens 
only needs one model to be detected: the first one of the full set of the conditional, that 
is, the one that is often identified without effort: 
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p  q 
This model and the information that ‘p’ happens, i.e., the information provided by the 
second premise of Modus Ponendo Ponens, are enough to derive ‘q’. And this is so 
because, in the only identified model, ‘q’ is always true when ‘p’ is also so.  
Nonetheless, Schema 2 needs at least two models in the easiest and simplest case. As 
said, such models are the following: 
p1     q 
   p2   q 
So, the data presented by Braine and O’Brien (1998b) seem to be in conflict with the 
predictions of the mental models theory. And, in López-Astorga’s opinion, the problem 
could be even bigger if we considered cases in which the disjunction included in the if-
clause of the first premise of Schema 2 had more than two disjuncts (López-Astorga, 
2015b, pp. 149-150). 
Nevertheless, I think that it would not be hard to respond to an objection such as this 
one. Firstly, the differences between the percentages of errors of Modus Ponendo 
Ponens and Schema 2 do not appear to be very significant (as said, the percentages are 
0% and 2%). Secondly, those percentages, as indicated by Braine and O’Brien (1998b), 
come from the experiments carried out by Braine et al. (1998), and, in those 
experiments, the arguments matching Schema 2 that were used only had two disjuncts 
in the antecedent of the conditional. An example is this one: 
“If there is either a D or a J, then there’s not a Q 
There is a D 
? There is a Q?” (Braine et al., 1998, p. 139). 
Therefore, it can be thought that, if the experimental tasks had included more disjuncts 
in the antecedents of their conditionals, maybe the percentages of mistakes would have 
been higher, and that hence Braine et al.’s results do not clearly undermine the theses 
and predictions of the mental models theory. 
In any case, what does be true is that perhaps the mental models theory needs to go any 
further into this issue and shows how the models are deployed on the human mind in a 
more systematic way. Nonetheless, in my view, this is not a task hard to do. The main 
assumptions of the mental models theory are, for example, absolutely consistent with 
clac 66/2016, 195-209 
lópez-astorga: mental logic 206 
the idea that, given a sentence with a structure as complex as that of the first premise of 
Schema 2, it is of course possible that, because working memory is limited, people only 
think about its models after knowing additional information (in this case, the 
information offered by the second premise), and that that information leads them to 
focus only on the relevant model, i.e., the model in which the information of the second 
premise is involved. In other words, this means that it is possible that, given a sentence 
such as ‘if p1 or p2 then q,’ individuals consider it to be so difficult and only reflect on 
its models after knowing, for example, ‘p2’, which would lead them to think about only 
a model such as this one: 
p2  q 
And this model in turn would lead them to conclude ‘q.’ Anyway, as stated, this is a 
point of the mental models theory that needs more exploration. 
6. Conclusions 
But this paper has shown that the mental logic theory is the one that has more 
difficulties to solve. Besides problems such as that of the identification of logical forms, 
which are to be found in the literature and have been mentioned above, its theses appear 
to include an important contradiction. On the one hand, it rejects the disjunction 
introduction rule. On the other hand, that rule seems to be absolutely necessary to use 
one of its Core Schemata: Schema 2. 
As commented on, the mental models theory, in principle, does not have this kind of 
problems. It can explain not only why people tend not to use the disjunction 
introduction rule, but also why there are certain cases in which that rule does be applied. 
In addition, this later theory can also account for why, in spite of the fact that 
individuals do not often use the mentioned rule, they do be able to make inferences 
involving sentences such as the conditional corresponding to Schema 2 of the mental 
logic theory. 
It is true that, as indicated, the mental models theory has its little difficulties too. 
However, as also explained, they do not seem to be so important and, probably, can be 
easy solved. Therefore, Ockham’s razor leads us to the mental models theory at the 
moment, since it appears to better account for the problems related to disjunction in 
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human reasoning. And this makes us doubt the existence of the syntax of thought 
claimed by the mental logic theory and seriously consider the idea that human 
inferential activity works by means of semantic analyses of possibilities. 
And this is so because, while the difficulties of the mental logic theory seem to be 
essential and related to its more important theses, those of the mental models theory 
appear to be only little details that need to be qualified. As also indicated, this later task 
does not seem to be very hard, and it can be easily made with further research. In fact, I 
have proposed a possible solution here for the problem of the number of models that the 
arguments with the structure of Schema 2 need. It is very possible that working memory 
only considers the strictly necessary models to make inferences, especially when the 
sentences are as complex as the conditional of that schema. Maybe further experimental 
work carried out by the proponents of the mental models theory could clarify to a 
greater extent this issue. 
References 
Bolzano, B. (1837). Wissenschaftslehre. Sulzbach, Germany: Seidel Buchhandlung. 
Braine, M. D. S. & O’Brien, D. P. (Eds.) (1998a). Mental Logic. Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers. 
Braine, M. D. S. & O’Brien, D. P. (1998b). The theory of mental-propositional logic: 
Description and illustration. In M. D. S. Braine & D. P. O’Brien (Eds.), Mental 
Logic (pp. 79-89). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers. 
Braine, M. D. S. & O’Brien, D. P. (1998c). How to investigate mental logic and the 
syntax of thought. In M. D. S. Braine & D. P. O’Brien (Eds.), Mental Logic (pp. 
45-61). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers. 
Braine, M. D. S., Reiser, B. J., & Rumain, B. (1998). Evidence for the theory: 
Predicting the difficulty of propositional logic inference problems. In M. D. S. 
Braine & D. P. O’Brien (Eds.), Mental Logic (pp. 91-144). Mahwah, NJ: 
Laurence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers. 
Gentzen, G. (1935). Untersuchungen über das logische Schließen I. Mathematische 
Zeitschrift, 39, 176-210. 
clac 66/2016, 195-209 
lópez-astorga: mental logic 208 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2006). How We Reason. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2010). Against logical form. Psychologica Belgica, 5(3/4), 193-
221. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2012). Inference with mental models. In K. J. Holyoak & R. G. 
Morrison (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning (pp. 134-145). 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2015). How to improve thinking. In R. Wegerif, L. Li, & J. C. 
Kaufman (Eds.), The Routledge International Handbook of Research on Teaching 
Thinking (pp. 80-91). Abingdon, UK, & New York, NY: Routledge. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N., Khemlani, S., & Goodwin, G. P. (2015). Logic, probability, and 
human reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 19(4), 201-214. 
Khemlani, S., Orenes, I., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2012). Negation: A theory of its 
meaning, representation, and inference. Psychological Review, 109(4), 646-678. 
Khemlani, S., Orenes, I., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2014). The negation of conjunctions, 
conditionals, and disjunctions. Acta Psychologica, 151, 1-7. 
López-Astorga, M. (2015a). The disjunction introduction rule: Syntactic and semantic 
considerations. Pragmalingüística, 23, 141-149. 
López-Astorga, M. (2015b). The case of the conditionals with disjunctions embedded 
into their antecedents: Mental logic versus semantic models. Universum, 30(2), 
143-152. 
López-Astorga, M. (2016). The principle of explosion: Aristotle versus the current 
syntactic theories. Schole, 10(1), 40-49. 
O’Brien, D. P. (2009). Human reasoning includes a mental logic. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 32, 96-97. 
O’Brien, D. P. (2014). Conditionals and disjunctions in mental-logic theory: A response 
to Liu and Chou (2012) and to López-Astorga (2013). Universum, 29(2), 221-235. 
O’Brien, D. P. & Li, S. (2013). Mental logic theory: A paradigmatic case of empirical 
research on the language of thought and inferential role semantics. Journal of 
Foreign Languages, 36(6), 27-41. 
clac 66/2016, 195-209 
lópez-astorga: mental logic 209 
O’Brien, D. P. & Manfrinati, A. (2010). The mental logic theory of conditional 
proposition. In M. Oaksford & N. Chater (Eds.), Cognition and conditionals: 
Probability and Logic in Human Thinking (pp. 39-54). Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
Orenes, I. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2012). Logic, models, and paradoxical inferences. 
Mind & Language, 27(4), 357-377 
Received: February 24, 2015 
Accepted: May 18, 2016  
Published: May 30, 2016 
 
 
clac 66/2016, 195-209 
